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Abstract
In his Quadratura, Paul of Venice considers a sophism involving time and tense
which appears to show that there is a valid inference which is also invalid. His argu-
ment runs as follows: consider this inference concerning some proposition A: A will
signify only that everything true will be false, so A will be false. Call this inference
B. Then B is valid because the opposite of its conclusion is incompatible with its
premise. In accordance with the standard doctrine of ampliation, Paul takes A to be
equivalent to ‘Everything that is or will be true will be false’. But he proceeds to
argue that it is possible that B’s premise (‘A will signify only that everything true
will be false’) could be true and its conclusion false, so B is not only valid but also
invalid. Thus A and B are the basis of an insoluble.
In his Logica Parva, a self-confessedly elementary text aimed at students and not
necessarily representing his own view, and in the Quadratura, Paul follows the the solu-
tion found in the Logica Oxoniensis, which posits an implicit assertion of its own truth
in insolubles like B. However, in the treatise on insolubles in his Logica Magna, Paul
develops and endorses Swyneshed’s solution, which stood out against this “multiple-
meanings” approach in offering a solution that took insolubles at face value, meaning
no more than is explicit in what they say. On this account, insolubles imply their own
falsity, and that is why, in so falsifying themselves, they are false. We consider how
both types of solution apply to B and how they complement each other. On both,
B is valid. But on one (following Swyneshed), B has true premises and false con-
clusion, and contradictories can be false together; on the other (following the Logica
Oxoniensis), the counterexample is rejected.
1 A Temporal Paradox
Paul of Venice’s Quadratura is not a treatise on squaring the circle or on determining area
in any way. Rather, it is an introductory logic text framed around four doubtful questions
(dubia), each of which provokes fifty sophisms in a wide variety of philosophical areas,
whose resolution allows Paul to present his students with a whole gamut of theories and
arguments. The quadrature is a pun, since each of the fifty sophisms provoked by the
four doubtful questions is resolved by four conclusions (or theses) and at least as many
∗To be presented at the XXIIIrd European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics: Time, Tense
and Modality, Warsaw 2021.
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corollaries.1 The first question asks whether the same inference can be both valid and
invalid. The fifteenth chapter, invoking an insoluble as sophismatic puzzle (Capitulum de
insolubilibus), argues as follows:
“Regarding the 〈first〉 doubtful question, one argues like this:
This inference 〈call it B〉 is valid: A will signify only that everything
true will be false, so A will be false; and this inference 〈B〉 is invalid. So
the question is true.
The argument is valid and I prove the premises, and first, the second premise:
for there is a possible scenario in which the premise of inference 〈B〉 is true
and its conclusion false, so inference 〈B〉 is not valid. I prove the premise: let
us assume that as long as A will exist, A will signify only that everything true
will be false, and 〈that〉 it will be the case that everything true will be false as
long as A will exist. On this assumption, the premise 〈of B〉 is true according
to the scenario; and I prove that the conclusion 〈of B〉 is false, because as long
as A will exist, A will be true, so it will not be false. I prove the premise,
because as long as A will exist, it will be the case that everything true will be
false, and as long as A will exist, A will signify only that everything true will
be false, therefore as long as A will exist, A will be true.
But now I prove the first premise 〈of the argument〉, namely, that inference
〈B〉 is valid, because the opposite of the conclusion is incompatible with the
premise, for these are incompatible:
A will signify only that everything true will be false
and
A will not be false.
Proof: I form this syllogism:
Everything true will be false, A will not be false, therefore A will not be
true.
This syllogism holds in Baroco, and as long as A will exist, it will be as the
premises signify. Hence, as long as A will exist, it will be as the conclusion
signifies. So A will exist and will be neither true nor false, which will be
impossible. That is shown in this way: A will not be false, and A will exist, so
A will be true as long as it will exist. Hence I argue like this:
Everything true will be false, A will be true, therefore A will be false.
This inference holds, and as long as A will exist, it will be as the premises
signify, therefore as long as A will exist, it will be as the conclusion signifies,
1“I will formulate four doubtful questions . . . first, whether the same inference can be both valid and
invalid; secondly, whether the same proposition can be both true and false; thirdly, whether disparate things
are true of the same thing; fourthly, whether two incompatibles can be both true or both false” (Quatuor
formabo dubia . . . primo utrum eadem consequentia sit bona et mala; secundo utrum eadem propositio sit
vera et falsa; tertio utrum de eodem sint verificabilia disparata; quarto utrum duo repugnantia possint esse
simul vera vel simul falsa). Quotations from Paul’s Quadratura are drawn from Appendix A to Paulus
Venetus (20xx).
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which is incompatible with the second conjunct of the conjunction composed of
the premise and the opposite of the conclusion of the original 〈inference B〉.”2
This needs careful analysis. At its heart is a self-referential proposition A, where we
assume that A will signify only that everything true will be false. This is the premise of
inference (consequentia) B, whose conclusion is that A will be false. Paul argues first that
B is invalid and then that B is valid. It follows, he says, that our overall question is true:
the same inference B can be both valid and invalid.
Let us first consider Paul’s argument that B is valid. He claims that the opposite of its
conclusion is incompatible with its premise. The reason is that Paul takes proposition A
to be equivalent to ‘Everything that is or will be true is false’. This was standard practice
acording to the medieval doctrine of ampliation, whereby a future-tense copula ampliates
its subject from the present to the future. That is, any proposition of the form
Every S will be P
is equivalent to
Everything that is or will be S will be P ,
and similarly for ‘Some S will be P ’, ‘No S will be P ’ and ‘Not every S will be P ’. For
example, ‘Everything white will be black’ is true if everything which is now white will be
black and everything which will at any future time be white, will (at some future time,
before, at or after the other) be black. If anything that is now or at some future time will
be white will not also at some future time be black, the proposition ‘Everything white will
be black’ was taken to be false.3
2Paulus Venetus (20xx, Appendix A §1.15.1): Quintodecimo principaliter ad questionem arguitur sic:
ista consequentia est bona: a significabit precise quod quodlibet verum erit falsum, ergo a erit falsum: et
hec eadem non valet, igitur questio vera.
(1.15.1.1) Tenet consequentia et antecedens probatur. Et primo pro secunda parte, nam casu possibili
posito antecedens est verum et consequens falsum, igitur consequentia non valet. Antecedens probatur: et
pono quod quamdiu a erit, a significabit precise quod quodlibet verum erit falsum, et ita erit quod quodlibet
verum erit falsum quamdiu a erit. Isto posito antecedens est verum per casum, et quod consequens sit
falsum probatur, nam quamdiu a erit a erit verum, igitur non erit falsum. Antecedens probatur: nam
quamdiu a erit, ita erit quod quodlibet verum erit falsum, et quamdiu a erit a significabit precise quod
quodlibet verum erit falsum, igitur quamdiu a erit a erit verum.
(1.15.1.2) Sed iam probatur prima pars antecedentis, videlicet quod illa consequentia est bona, quoniam
oppositum consequentis repugnat antecedenti, hec enim repugnant a significabit precise quod quodlibet verum
erit falsum et a non erit falsum. Probatur, et facio istam consequentiam: quodlibet verum erit falsum, a non
erit falsum, igitur a non erit verum. Ista consequentia tenet in quarto secunde figure, et quamdiu a erit,
erit ita sicut significatur per antecedens, igitur quamdiu erit a, erit ita sicut significatur per consequens,
et ita a erit et non erit verum nec falsum, quid erit impossibile. Confirmatur sic: a non erit falsum, et
a erit, igitur a erit verum quamdiu erit; arguo ergo sic: omne verum erit falsum, a erit verum, igitur a
erit falsum. Ista consequentia est bona, et quamdiu a erit, erit ita sicut significatur per antecedens, igitur
quamdiu a erit, erit ita sicut significatur per consequens, quod repugnat secunde parti principalis copulative
facte ex antecedente et opposito consequentis. On the meaning of ‘significat precise’ (which is rendered here
as ‘signify only’) see De Rijk (1982, p.177).
3See, e.g., Paulus Venetus (1984, pp.161-3): “Every term standing in initial position with respect to
a verb of future time or to its participle stands for that which is or which will be, e.g., in ‘A man will
be generated’, ‘man’ stands for only that which is or which will be. Thus it signifies this proposition:
‘Whoever is a man or whoever will be a man will be generated’.” See more generally, e.g., Kann (2016,
§9.3.3).
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The proof that B is valid is straightforward. Take the contradictory opposite of its
conclusion, viz ‘A will not be false’. So assuming A exists, A will be true.4 But then
according to the premise, everything that will be true will be false, so A will be false,
contradicting the assumption that A will not be false. So as long as A will exist, and
as part of B it does exist, the premise of B is incompatible with the contradictory of its
conclusion, so B is valid.
This is not exactly how Paul presents the argument, but formulating the reasoning
in this way brings out how remarkably similar it is to that in Yablo’s paradox. Yablo’s
paradox explicitly invokes a sequence of propositions, each referring to all subsequent
propositions in sequence:5
S1: for all k > 1, Sk is untrue
S2: for all k > 2, Sk is untrue
. . .
Suppose that for some n, Sn is true. Then for all k > n, Sk is untrue, in particular, Sn+1
is untrue and for all k > n+ 1, Sk is untrue. But that is what Sn+1 says, so Sn+1 is (also)
true. Accordingly, there can be no n such that Sn is true, that is, for all n, Sn is untrue.
But Yablo points out that if every Sn is untrue, then “the sentences subsequent to any
given Sn are all untrue, whence Sn is true after all.” Contradiction.
Yablo’s intermediate conclusion that every Sn is untrue matches Paul’s intermediate
conclusion above that given that everything true will be false, A will not be false and so
B is valid. So far, so good. But then Paul, like Yablo, realises that this conclusion will
lead to paradox. For there is a counterexample to the validity of B: suppose that as long
as A exists, it will continue to signify that everything true will be false, and that in fact
it will continue to be the case that everything true will be false. Then A will continue to
be true, but B’s premise will be true and its conclusion false. So B is invalid. Paradox.
2 Theories of Insolubles from Bradwardine to Paul of Venice
Paul’s Quadratura is preserved in three manuscripts and an incunabulum of 1493 (Paulus
Venetus, 1493). The Vatican manuscripts (Vat.Lat.2133 and 2134) have a colophon to the
fourth doubt, which reads:
“Here end the sophistical Determinations with their tables composed by me,
brother Paul of Venice of the Order of the Brother Hermits of St Augustine
while I was teacher in the Convent at Padua and Bachelor of the same most
Holy Order.”6
4The medievals took propositions to be concrete, token utterances, which were neither true nor false if
they were not uttered, and (for the most part) were either true or false if they did.
5Yablo (1993). Hanke (2014, §3.2) finds Yablo’s paradox, or something very similar to it, in Lax (1508)
and Celaya’s Insolubilia (see Roure, 1962). Yablo’s declared aim was to formulate paradox without the
circularity of self-reference. Whether Yablo’s formulation really does avoid self-reference is a matter of
contention: see, e.g., Priest (1997) and Read (2006).
6BAV Vat.Lat.2133, f.141rb, 2134, f.161rb: Expliciunt determinaciones sophistice cum tabulis earundem
acte per me fratrem Paulum de Veneciis ordinis fratrum heremitarum sancti Augustini dum essem lector
in conventu Paduano ac bacellarius eiusdem sacratissimi ordinis.
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The Determinations were an exercise which Paul completed for his Magister Artium at
Padua between October 1399 and July 1400, after which he enrolled as a Bachelor of
Theology.7 In the Quadratura he draws on the solution to the insolubles which he had
presented in his Logica Parva, composed shortly after his return to Italy from three years’
study at the Augustinian Convent in Oxford, a solution derived from one he describes
in his Logica Magna as that “which is now generally maintained by everyone.”8 But it is
different from his favoured solution in the Logica Magna. We need to look back to Thomas
Bradwardine’s iconoclastic solution presented in his Insolubilia in the early 1320s to trace
the origins of these three solutions.
Bradwardine’s revolutionary idea was that insolubles, indeed, all propositions, might
mean (denotare) or signify (significare) more than is immediate at first glance, or as
Heytesbury would put it ten years later, more than the words commonly suggest (verba
communiter pretendunt). Bradwardine proposed a principle to govern this multiplicity
of overt and hidden meanings, his second postulate: every proposition signifies or means
anything which follows from anything it signifies or means.9 Then he was able to provide
a rather clever and subtle proof that any proposition which signifies its own falsity also
signifies its own truth. Since what seems to be characteristic of many insolubles is that
they signify their own falsity, it follows that they are implicitly contradictory in signifying
both (overtly) that they are false and (covertly) that they are true. So if truth requires, as
seems most plausible if one thinks of multiple meanings as being essentially conjunctive,
that everything a proposition signifies must obtain, it is impossible for everything these
insolubles signify to obtain, and so something they signify fails to obtain and they are all
false. Moreover, although they are false and they signify that they are false, it does not
follow (as the standard argument goes) that they are true, for their being false is only part
of what they signify, so though one might say they are partly true (true secundum quid),
they are also partly false, and so are as a whole (simpliciter) false.
Most of Bradwardine’s successors, in a flurry of treatments of the insolubles in the
fourteenth century, took up the idea that there might be hidden, additional, meanings
to propositions, but few were willing to endorse Bradwardine’s second postulate and the
proof using it to show that insolubles also signify their own truth. Bradwardine’s fellow
Calculator, William Heytesbury,10 notoriously suggested that if someone presented an
apparent insoluble saying that what it appeared to signify is all it signifies, one should
reject it outright, whereas if it was presented without that stipulation, it should be accepted
but that it is true should be denied, on the grounds that it must have some hidden
meaning whch failed to obtain.11 Heytesbury was able to act in this seemingly cavalier way
because he framed his solution in the language of obligations, whereby the Respondent,
to whom he was offering this advice, was only allowed to accept or reject the initial
obligation (or positum) presented to him by his Opponent, and to grant, deny or doubt
7On the role of Determinations de sophismatibus in the Arts curriculum, see, e.g., Weisheipl (1971).
8Paulus Venetus (20xx, §2.12.1): Duodecima opinio, que iam communiter ab omnibus sustinetur . . . .
9Bradwardine (2010, §6.3): Secunda est ista: quelibet propositio significat sive denotat ut nunc vel
simpliciter omne quod sequitur ad istam ut nunc vel simpliciter. On the justification for interpreting this
as a closure condition, see Bradwardine (2010, ‘Introduction’ §5, p.17).
10Both Bradwardine and Heytesbury are more famous in the history of science as leading members of
the Oxford Calculators than they are as logicians: see, e.g., Sylla (1982).
11See Heytesbury’s second and third rules in Heytesbury (1979, §§49-50) (Pozzi, 1987, V §§3.06-3.071).
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subsequent propositions which the Opponent proposed.12 In particular, when challenged
as to what this hidden meaning might be, on which the whole success of the solution
turned, Heytesbury could invoke the framework of obligations theory to say that the
Respondent was under no obligation to specify what it might be, but only to respond by
granting or denying.13 He was thus able to trace the narrow but consistent line of granting
the insoluble but denying that it was true.
Unsurprisingly, many subsequent writers were frustrated by Heytesbury’s caution,
though they were happy to adopt his framework of obligations theory. They adapted
his solution so that the hidden meaning was in fact specified as asserting the truth of
the insoluble. That claim is false, since it is inconsistent with its overt meaning, and
accordingly the insoluble is granted but its truth is denied and its falsehood granted. This
solution became very popular, at least in Oxford, and was incorporated in most of the
Oxford logic textbooks of the late fourteenth century, the Logica Oxoniensis as it has
been dubbed by De Rijk (1977). Among later proponents were John of Holland and John
Hunter (aka Venator).14 We might call it the “modified Heytesbury solution”. A possible
link between Heytesbury’s and these later treatises is that of Ralph Strode (see Spade,
1975, item LIII, pp.87-91), whose solution is explicitly based on combining Bradwardine’s
and Heytesbury’s, and was composed in Oxford, probably in the late 1350s, and so before
Holland’s and Hunter’s treatises.15 Strode writes (f.10va):
“‘Regarding this third opinion, namely, that of Heytesbury, in so far as it
agrees with Thomas Bradwardine’s opinion, I consider it to be true, namely, in
that it claims that it is impossible for an insoluble proposition to signify only
as the words commonly suggest. For example, supposing that the proposition
‘There is a falsehood’ is the only proposition, it is impossible that it only
signifies that there is a falsehood. But in so far as it is claimed that, in the
given scenario, it is not decided or stated by the Respondent what else that
proposition signifies, or in what other way that proposition signifies, I do not
consider it to be true.”16
12On the theory of obligations and the ubiquity of its terminology in logical treatises of the fourteenth
century, see, e.g., Dutilh Novaes and Uckelman (2016).
13“But if anyone asks what in this scenario the proposition uttered by Socrates [viz ‘Socrates says a
falsehood’] will signify other than that Socrates says a falsehood, I reply that the Respondent does not
have to answer that question, because it follows from that scenario that his proposition signifies other than
that Socrates says a falsehood, but the scenario does not specify what it is and so the Respondent does
not have to give any further answer to the question” (Si autem quaeratur in casu illo quid significabit illa
propositio dicta a Sorte aliter quam quod Sortes dicit falsum, huic dicitur quod respondens non habebit illud
seu illam quaestionem determinare, quia ex casu isto sequitur quod ista propositio aliter significet quam
quod Sortes dicit falsum, sed casus ille non certificat quid illud sit et ideo non habet respondens quaesitum
illud ulterius determinare (Pozzi, 1987, V §3.072)). For an alternative translation, see Heytesbury (1979,
§51).
14John of Holland’s treatise on insolubles is edited in Bos (1985); John Hunter’s in Pironet (2008, §15.8,
pp.301-23).
15See Maieru` (1982b, p.89). Whether it is earlier than the anonymous treatises cannot be determined
until their dates are known.
16Ralph Strode, Tractatus de Insolubilibus, ms Erfurt Amploniana Q 255, f.10va: Circa vero tertiam
opinionem, videlicet ipsius Hentisberi, quantum ad hoc quod concordat cum opinione magistri Thome
Bradwardijn, ipsam reputo esse veram, videlicet in hoc quod ponit quod inpossibile est propositionem insol-
ubilem precise significare sicud verba illius communiter pretendunt. Verbi gratia, posito quod ista propositio
’falsum est’ sit omnis propositio, tunc inpossibile est istam precise significare falsum esse. Sed quantum
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Strode proceeds in the Third Part of his treatise to apply his preferred solution to a range
of insolubles. His response to the widely discussed scenario in which Socrates says only
‘Socrates says a falsehood’ (Sortes dicit falsum), labelled ‘A’, he writes:
“Regarding the solution to this insoluble it should be realised that close atten-
tion be noted whether in the presentation of the scenario it is supposed that
the insoluble proposition signifies only as the words prima facie suggest, or
it is supposed that they signify in that way but not with the addition of the
adverb ‘only’. If it was given in the first way, the scenario should in no way
be accepted, because the scenario is impossible, as was clearly stated above.
If it was given in the second way, then the scenario should be accepted, and
generally so in every insoluble scenario. Furthermore, one should deny that
A is true and grant that A is false and also that the proposition uttered by
Socrates is false.”17
He spells out the reason for those verdicts about the truth and falsehood of the insoluble
in response to the next insoluble he considers, namely, where all and only those who speak
the truth will receive a penny, and Socrates pipes up, ‘Socrates will not receive a penny’:
“And so, just as 〈in the case of〉 the proposition ‘Socrates says a falsehood’,
supposing that he says only that, the proposition is insoluble, the proposition
‘Socrates will not receive a penny’ is an insoluble proposition in the scenario de-
scribed, and consequently in line with what was established earlier, it signifies
itself to be false and itself to be true.”18
It is this modified Heytesbury solution which Paul presents in the chapter on insolubles
in his Logica Parva. It is explicitly directed at students, and does not necessarily represent
his own view. He writes at the end of the chapter:
“Notice that not everything I have said here, or in other treatises, have I said
according to my own view, but partly according to the view of others, in order
to enable young beginners to progress more easily.”19
Similar solutions attributing an additional signification, or something similar, to insol-
ubles were offered by John Buridan, Albert of Saxony, Gregory of Rimini, Peter of Ailly,
ad hoc quod ponitur quod, isto casu posito, non est determinandum uel dicendum a respondente quid aliud
ista propositio significet uel qualiter aliter quam ista propositio significet, ipsam non reputo esse veram.
17loc.cit,: Circa solutionem istius insolubilis est aduertendum quod diligenter est notandum in positione
casus, vtrum ponatur quod talis propositio insolubilis precise significet sicud verba illius prima facie pre-
tendunt, vel ponatur quod sic significet, non tamen addendo istud aduerbium precise. Si primo modo fiat
positio, nullo modo est casus admittendus, quia casus est inpossibilis, sicud diffuse patet per superius dicta.
Si vero secundo modo fiat positio, tunc admittendus est casus, et istud generale est in omni casu insolubili.
Et vlterius dicitur negando a esse verum, et conceditur quod a est falsum et etiam quod propositio dicta a
Sorte est falsa.
18ibid., f.10vb: Et ideo, sicud ista propositio ’Sor dicit falsum’, posito quod solam istam dicat, est
propositio insolubilis, ita ista propositio ’Sor non habebit denarium’ est propositio insolubilis, casu predicto
posito, et per consequens secundum predeterminata significat se esse falsam et se esse veram.
19Paulus Venetus (2002, p.150, amended against ms BAV, Vat.Lat. 5363, f.39rb): Nota quod non
quecumque fuit locutus hic, seu in ceteris tractatibus, ego dixi secundum intentionem propriam, sed partim
secundum intentionem aliorum, ut iuvenes incipientes proficere facilius introducantur. For an alternative
translation, see Paulus Venetus (1984, pp.255-6).
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Marsilius of Inghen and others. But some were unpersuaded.20 Notable among them was
Roger Swyneshed, another Calculator, writing in Oxford in the 1330s. His aim was to find
a viable solution to the insolubles by taking them at face value, and his big idea was that
insolubles falsify themselves—in an intuitive sense which he set out to make formal and
precise. That is, for Swyneshed, the interesting characteristic of insolubles is that they
imply their own falsehood. Indeed, that’s usually the first leg of a proof of contradiction
from them: first, we show that they are false, then feel forced to infer that they must also
be true (since that’s what they say). Swyneshed avoids this second leg of the paradox
argument by broadening the definition of ‘false’: a proposition is false (he says) if either
things are not as it signifies (in the normal communiter pretendunt sense of ‘signifies’) or
they falsify themselves (in the sense that they imply their own falsehood). For example,
‘This proposition is false’ falsifies itself because from ‘This proposition is false’ we can
immediately infer that it is false; ‘Every proposition is false’ faisifies itself in the sense
that it implies that it itself, being a proposition, is false; ‘What Socrates says is false’
falsifies itself if it is the only proposition uttered by Socrates, since we can then infer that
it is itself false. In general, a proposition is true if and only if things are as it signifies and
it does not falsify itself.21 So, given that ‘This proposition is false’ is false, since it falsifies
itself, we cannot infer that it is true (on the grounds that things are as it signifies) since
it does not meet the extra condition of not falsifying itself.
3 Paul’s Two Solutions to the Temporal Paradox
As we noted in §2, Paul offers different solutions to the insolubles in different works. In
the Logica Parva and the Quadratura, the solution he favours is the modified Heytesbury
solution; in the Logica Magna and the Sophismata Aurea, it is Swyneshed’s.
That Paul applies the modified Heytesbury solution to the insolubles in the Quadratura
is clear from the second and third Conclusions which he sets out in preparing his response
to the temporal insoluble we considered in §1. The second Conclusion states:
“There is some proposition signifying principally purely predicatively which at
some time will signify principally in a compound way. Nonetheless, there will
be no change in it, nor will any new imposition be added to it.”22
In proof, Paul claims that ‘Every proposition is false’ satisfies this claim, assuming that
at some time it will be the only proposition, for its principal signification is (now) purely
predicatively that every proposition is false. But, he says,
“. . . when it will be the only proposition it will signify principally that ev-
ery proposition is false and that it is true, just like other insolubles, whose
20Two others who resisted Bradwardine’s innovation, and in fact defended earlier views against Bradwar-
dine’s criticisms, were Walter Segrave, defending restrictionism (restrictio), and John Dumbleton, defending
cassationism (cassatio): see Spade (1975, items LXVIII and XXXVI, respectively).
21See Spade (1979, §§14-15, pp.185-6).
22Paulus Venetus (20xx, Appendix A §1.15.2.2): Secunda conclusio est ista: aliqua est propositio signif-
icans solum cathegorice principaliter que aliquando significabit ypothetice principaliter, et tamen nulla in
ea fiet mutatio, nec nova adveniet illi impositio.
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significations reflect wholly on themselves.”23
The point is reiterated and elaborated in discussing his third Conclusion, namely:
“It is possible for every proposition to be false and for ‘Every proposition is
false’ to signify exactly that every proposition is false.”24
Again, the relevant scenario is one where ‘Every proposition is false’ (call it A) is the only
proposition. Then, he says,
“I claim that in this scenario A signifies that every proposition is false and
〈that〉 A is true. This conjunctive significate is called the principal significate
of A, although it is not the exact 〈significate〉, which is only the first part.”25
That is, when A is the only proposition, it signifies conjunctively and principally that
every proposition is false and that A is true, but its exact significate is that every propo-
sition is false, as the third Conclusion claims. This response is clearly very different from
Swyneshed’s solution and belongs to the tradition started by Bradwardine where an in-
soluble has a further covert signification. But unlike Heytesbury himself, Paul commits
himself squarely to the claim that the additional signification is that the insoluble itself is
true, in the way we have seen that the modified Heytesbury solution does.
Paul’s response to the temporal insoluble is to accept that B is valid, and to deny that
there is any scenario in which its premise is true and conclusion false, as was claimed. In
particular, the scenario described in the sophism itself is impossible and so fails to show
that B is invalid. Recall that the argument was that we could “assume that as long as A
will exist, A will signify only that everything true will be false, and 〈that〉 it will be the
case that everything true will be false as long as A will exist.” It follows, it was claimed,
that “on this assumption, the premise 〈of B〉 is true according to the scenario.” Not so.
For if A is indeed an insoluble, it will not signify only that everything true will be false,
that is, what it standardly signifies, but it will also signify that it itself is true.
So is A an insoluble? In his Logica Parva, Paul defines an insoluble as a proposition
signifying consequentially (assertive significans) its own falsehood, later distinguishing
insolubles unqualifiedly (insolubile simpliciter) from insolubles qualifiedly (insolubile se-
cundum quid), where an insoluble unqualifiedly is one to which a scenario is attached
which implies a contradiction if admitted.26 But for the most part, he proceeds in this
text by example. If we look back to pseudo-Heytesbury’s treatise, we find Heytesbury’s
original definitions followed more closely:
23loc.cit: . . . quando ipsa erit omnis propositio significabit principaliter quod omnis propositio est falsa,
et quod ipsa est vera, quemadmodum et alia insolubilia, quorum significationes reflectuntur ad se totaliter.
241.15.2.3: Tertia conclusio est ista: possibile est omnem propositionem esse falsam, et hanc: omnis
propositio est falsa, significare adequate omnem propositionem esse falsam.
25loc.cit: . . . quia dicitur in casu isto quod a significat omnem propositionem esse falsam, et a esse
verum. Et hoc significatum copulativum dicitur principale significatum a, licet non adequatum sed solum
prima pars.
26Paulus Venetus (2002, p.128): Insolubile est propositio se esse falsam assertive significans . . . Insol-
ubilium aliquod est insolubile simpliciter, aliquod very secundum quid. Insolubile simpliciter est illud cui
annectitur cases quo admisso sequitur contradictio. For an alternative translation, see Paulus Venetus
(1984, p.237). On the phrase ‘significans assertive’ as meaning ‘signifying consequentially’, or ‘implicitly’,
see Nuchelmans (1980, pp.45-46) and De Rijk (1982, pp.175-7).
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“An insoluble proposition is one of which mention is made in some 〈insoluble〉
scenario which, if in that scenario it signifies only in that way, it would follow
was true and false,”
where an insoluble scenario is one
“in which a proposition is mentioned which, if it signifies in that scenario only
as the words suggest, it follows is true and false.”27
Given that B is valid, then if A does signify that everything true will be false, A will be
false. So if the proposed scenario was possible, A would be both true and false, and so the
scenario would be an insoluble scenario and A would be an insoluble. But in that case, A
would not only signify that everything true will be false, but also that it itself is true. So
the proposed scenario is impossible. Paul concludes this chapter of his Quadratura with
the words:
“From this it is clear how to respond to the original argument, 〈namely〉 by
granting this inference: ‘A will signify only that everything true will be false,
therefore A will be false’, and as for the counter-instance, I do not accept the
scenario, because it implies a contradiction, as has been clearly seen. Hence
etc.”28
leaving his readers to put the pieces together.
In his Logica Magna, however, Paul rejects Heytesbury’s solution, and passes over the
modified version in silence. That is odd, since his main criticism there of Heytesbury’s
solution is its reluctance to specify what the implicit signification of insolubles is.29 In any
case, having rejected Heytesbury’s, together with fourteen other putative solutions, Paul
adopts and adapts Swyneshed’s solution and applies it at length to a range of insolubles.
The temporal paradox is, however, not among them, so it is an interesting exercise to see
how Swyneshed’s, and Paul’s, solution deals with it.
To start with, the definition of insoluble is different, and indeed, comes in two forms,
a narrower and a broader one. Paul gives the narrower one in the second chapter of the
treatise on insolubles in his Logica Magna:
“An insoluble proposition is a proposition having reflection on itself wholly or
partially implying its own falsity or that it is not itself true.”30
27Pironet (2008, p.290): Est sciendum quod casus insolubilis est ille in quo fit mentio de aliqua propo-
sitione quae, si cum eodem casu significat praecise sicut verba illius praetendunt, sequitur eamdem esse
veram et falsam . . . Sed propositio insolubilis est illa de qua fit mentio in aliqua casu quae, si cum eodem
casu sic significet praecise, sequeretur ipsam esse veram et falsam. Cf. Heytesbury’s own text at (Pozzi,
1987, V §3.01-02)), translated at (Heytesbury, 1979, §44-45). Note that where some mss of Heytesbury’s
treatise read ‘sequitur eam esse veram et eam esse falsam’ (it follows both that it is true and that it is
false), others read ‘ad eam esse veram sequitur eam esse falsam et econtra’ (from its being true it follows
that it is false and vice versa): see, e.g., Strobino (2012, p.488 n.24). Given natural assumptions, these
formulae are equivalent. On the sheer complexity of extant mss of Heytesbury’s text, see Spade (1989).
28Per hoc patet responsio ad argumentum principale concedendo illam consequentiam: a significabit
precise quod quodlibet verum erit falsum, igitur a erit falsum, et ad improbationem non admitto casum,
quia implicat contradictionem ut clare est ostensum. Quare etc.
29See Paulus Venetus (20xx, §§1.12.3.1.2-1.12.3.2.3).
30Paulus Venetus (20xx, §2.1.8): Propositio insolubilis est propositio habens supra se reflexionem sue
falsitatis aut se non esse veram, totaliter vel partialiter illativa.
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In brief, insolubles are self-falsifying propositions. Paul comments that his definition
excludes many propositions counted as insolubles by others, such as ‘Socrates will not
cross the bridge’ and ‘Plato will not have a penny’, for he says, they do not have reflection
on themselves. But he is not consistent here, for in the fifth chapter he includes them under
what he calls “insolubles that don’t appear at first glance to be insolubles” (insolubilia
que prima facie insolubilia non apparent). It is in the eighth chapter that he comes to
further cases that he believes only appear to be insolubles, such as ‘This proposition is
not known to you’ and ‘This is in doubt for you’, which others would include as epistemic
insolubles.31
Swyneshed himself gave a broader definition which included these epistemic paradoxes:
“An insoluble as put forward is a proposition signifying principally as things
are or other than things are 〈which is〉 relevant to inferring itself to be false or
unknown or not believed, and so on.”32
Paul himself is tempted to broaden his definition to include the epistemic insolubles, when,
for example, he presents his fourth Conclusion:
“There is a formally valid inference, known by you to be so, signifying 〈exactly〉
by the composition of its parts, where the premise is known by you, yet the
conclusion is not known by you.”33
The example he gives is what may be called the Inferential Knower Paradox:34
This is unknown to you, therefore this is unknown to you
where each occurrence of ‘this’ refers to the conclusion. For, he says, “the premise is
known by you, because you know that the conclusion is not known, since it is an insoluble
that implies that it itself is unknown.”35 Thus the idea in the broadening of the definition
is to say that just as propositions which imply their own falsehood are self-falsifying and
so are false, so too propositions which imply they are not known are not known and those
which imply they are believed are not believed, and so on.
However, in our temporal paradox, proposition A, as we have seen, does indeed imply
its own falsehood. This is shown by the valid inference B. Thus A will be false as long as
it exists and signifies that everything true will be false. Hence there is no scenario where
A is true, for without new imposition it will continue to signify only that everything true
will be false.
31See, e.g., Bradwardine (2010, ch.9) and Bottin (1973).
32Spade (1979, §16): Insolubile ad propositum est propositio significans principaliter sicut est vel aliter
quam est pertinens ad inferendum se ipsam fore falsam vel nescitam vel 〈non〉 creditam, et sic de singulis.
(‘non’ is added for sense in that last clause following the edition in Pozzi, 1987, p.282.)
33Paulus Venetus (20xx, §2.3.4): Quarta conclusio: aliqua consequentia est bona et formalis, scita a
te esse talis, significans 〈adequate〉 ex compositione suarum partium, et antecedens est scitum a te et
consequens non est scitum a te.
34On the Knower Paradox, see, e.g., Sorensen (2018, §5.1). In Spade (1979, §§80-81), Swyneshed argues
that ‘This proposition is unknown’ is unknown.
35Paulus Venetus (20xx, §2.3.4): . . . antecedens est scitum a te, quia scis illud consequens non sciri,
cum sit insolubile asserens se nesciri.
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